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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Section 78-2a-3 (2) (h), Utah Code Annotated. This is an appeal 
from a Summary Judgment granted by the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, 
District Court Judge on August 10, 1987, and amended on September 
8, 1987, dismissing plaintifffs Complaint as to all causes of 
action and granting defendant judgment in the sum of $28,609.97 
plus interest and costs of court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court erred in holding that the 
two contracts between plaintiff and defendant were not 
enforceable because they failed to comply with the Statute of 
Frauds. 
2. Whether an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing extends to contracts which do not meet the requirements 
of the Statute of Frauds. 
3. Whether questions of fact exist with regard to 
defendant's alleged interference with contractual relationships 
between plaintiff and third parties. 
4. Whether defendant was unjustly enriched as a result of 
plaintiff's activities in the Salt Lake area. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
70A-1-203 Utah Code Annotated (1981 Rep. Vol.) 
Obligation of good faith. 
Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation 
of good faith in its performance or enforcement. 
70A-2-201 Utah Code Annotated (1981 Rep. Vol.) 
Formal requirements - Statute of frauds. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a 
contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more 
is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there 
is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for 
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the 
party against whom enforcement is sought or by his 
authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient 
because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon 
but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph 
beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing. 
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a 
writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient 
against the sender is received and the party receiving it 
has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the 
requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless 
written notice of objection to its contents is given within 
ten days after it is received. 
i 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements 
of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is 
enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured 
for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others 
in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the 
seller, before notice of repudiation is received and 
under circumstances which reasonably indicated that the 
goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial 
beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their 
procurement; or 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is 
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise 
in court that a contract for sale was made, but the 
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contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond 
the quantity of goods admitted; or 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has 
been made and accepted or which have been received and 
accepted (section 70A-2-606). 
70A-2-206(l) Utah Code Annotated (1981 Rep. Vol.) 
Offer and acceptance in formation of contract. 
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the 
language or circumstances 
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be 
construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by 
any medium reasonable in the circumstances; 
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for 
prompt or current shipment shall be construed as 
inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship 
or by the prompt or current shipment of nonconforming 
goods, but such a shipment of nonconforming goods does 
not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably 
notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as 
an accommodation to the buyer. 
2-201(2) Uniform Commercial Code Official Comments. 
1. The required writing need not contain all the 
material terms of the contract and such material terms as 
are stated need not be precisely stated. All that is 
required is that the writing afford a basis for believing 
that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction. 
It may be written in lead pencil on a scratch pad. It need 
not indicate which party is the buyer and which the seller. 
The only term which must appear is the quantity term which 
need not be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the 
amount stated. The price, time and place of payment or 
delivery, the general quality of the goods, or any 
particular warranties may all be omitted. 
Special emphasis must be placed on the permissibility 
of omitting the price term in view of the insistence of some 
courts on the express inclusion of this term even where the 
parties have contracted on the basis of a published price 
list. In many valid contracts for sale the parties do not 
mention the price in express terms, the buyer being bound to 
pay and the seller to accept a reasonable price which the 
trier of the fact may well be trusted to determine. Again, 
frequently the price is not mentioned since the parties have 
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based their agreement on a price list or catalogue known to 
both of them and this list serves as an efficient safeguard 
against perjury. Finally, "market" prices and valuations 
that are current in the vicinity constitute a similar check. 
Thus if the price is not stated in the memorandum it can 
normally be supplied without danger of fraud. Of course if 
the "price" consists of goods rather than money the quantity 
of goods must be stated. 
Only three definite and invariable requirements as to 
the memorandum are made by this subsection. First, it must 
evidence a contract for the sale of goods; second, it must 
be "signed", a word which includes any authentication which 
identifies the party to be charged; and third, it must 
specify a quantity. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises from a distributor relationship between the 
parties wherein Beehive Brick, Inc. agreed to act as local 
distributor for brick and related products manufactured by 
Robinson Brick Company. Beehive complains that Robinson breached 
its duties under the agreement and caused damages to Beehive. 
The complaint filed by Beehive alleges breach of contract in two 
respects, failure to deal in good faith, interference with 
contract and unjust enrichment. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Upon filing of the Complaint and service upon defendant, 
Robinson answered and counterclaimed against Beehive for sums due 
and owing to Robinson pursuant to an open account agreement with 
Beehive. 
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Following substantial discovery, Robinson filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of Beehive's Complaint and 
requesting judgment on its Counterclaim. At hearing on 
Robinson's Motion for Summary Judgment held on July 28, 1987, the 
Court, without findings, granted Summary Judgment as requested by 
Robinson. An Amended Summary Judgment was entered on the Court 
records on September 9, 1987. Notice of Appeal was filed by 
Beehive on September 15, 1987. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about February 20, 1985, plaintiff Beehive Brick 
Inc. and defendant Robinson Brick Company, entered into agreement 
allowing Beehive to sell products manufactured by Robinson at 
their Colorado plant. (Record at page 3, 15.) 
2. Beehive was initially told that the distributor 
relationship would be a testing period and that the relationship 
would only become permanent if Beehive could adequately represent 
the interests of Robinson Brick in Utah. (Deposition of Dee 
Young, pages 18 and 19; Record at page 15.) 
3. On or about July 15, 1985, Beehive was notified that 
Robinson was terminating the distributor relationship and had 
appointed a competitor as the exclusive distributor in the Salt 
Lake area. (Record at page 3, 16, 39.) 
4. At the time the distributorship arrangement was 
terminated, Robinson agreed to allow Beehive to place orders 
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prior to October 15, 1985. (Record at page 3, 16; Deposition of 
Randall Browning, Exhibit 13.) 
5. Prior to October 15, 1985, Beehive placed an order with 
Robinson for one million brick. Beehive requested that the brick 
be of a particular color requiring special manufacturing. 
However, Beehive further indicated that if the special color 
could not be manufactured, the stock color would be acceptable. 
(Deposition of Randall Browning at pages 84-86, Exhibit 7.) 
6. At the time the order was placed, both parties were 
notified that delivery of the one million brick would be taken 
over a period of 12 to 14 months. (Deposition of Dee Young, page 
32.) 
7. Between November of 1985 and February of 1986, Robinson 
attempted on at least three occasions to manufacture the special 
color requested by Beehive and, in fact, delivered several test 
batches to Beehive which were accepted and used by Beehive's 
customer. (Deposition of Randall Browning at page 88; Deposition 
of Dee Young, page 44-46.) 
8. Toward the end of March, 1986, Robinson advised Beehive 
that it would be able to give Beehive a non-exclusive or split 
distributorship. (Deposition of Dee Young at page 55-56.) 
9. Between approximately March 30, 1986 and April 15, 
1986, employees of Robinson encouraged Beehive to get ready to 
start placing orders. (Deposition of Dee Young, page 58.) 
10. On or about April 15, 1986 Robinson notified Beehive 
that they would not grant the split distributorship and would be 
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terminating the relationship immediately. (Deposition of Dee 
Young, page 60.) 
11. By letter dated April 17, 1986, Robinson notified 
Beehive that they would again be terminating the dealership 
arrangement immediately. Said letter indicated that they would 
not be able to manufacture the special color requested by 
Beehive, but would fill the order by substituting brick which 
were in stock. The letter further advised Beehive that they must 
take delivery of the remaining order by May 16, 1986. (Deposition 
of Randall Browning, Exhibit 14; Record at page 62; Deposition of 
Monte Jones, Exhibit 2.) 
12. At the time of termination, Beehive owed Robinson the 
sum of $28,609.97 pursuant to their open account agreement. 
13. Subsequent to April 17, 1986, Robinson's agents 
approached former customers of Beehive in an attempt to fill the 
one million brick order previously placed by Beehive. 
(Deposition of Randall Browning at page 118.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Beehive contends that the District Court erred in 
granting Summary Judgment relating to the contract for the 
purchase of one million brick due to the existence of substantial 
questions of fact relating to the existence of the contract as 
well as substantial questions of law relating to the compliance 
by the various parties with the requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds. 
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2. Beehive complied with the requirements of the Statute 
of Frauds in relation to its distributorship arrangement with 
Robinson and, as such, the District Court erred in granting 
Summary Judgment. 
3. The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is 
applicable to all stages of the contract relationship. The 
obligation to act in good faith is not contingent upon the 
enforceability of the underlying contract. 
4. The District Court erred in granting summary judgment 
as to Beehive's Third Cause of Action due to the existence of 
questions of fact regarding Robinson's attempts to interfere with 
contracts of Beehive. 
5. Beehive conferred substantial benefit upon Robinson by 
serving as a distributor at a time when Robinson had no other 
distributor in the Salt Lake area. Beehive accepted the 
temporary distributorship with the understanding that they would 
be granted a permanent distributorship if they could adequately 
represent the products of Robinson. Beehive should be fairly 
compensated for the benefit which they conferred upon Robinson. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW 
EXISTED WHICH PRECLUDED THE ENTRY OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RELATIVE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
The First Cause of Action in Beehive's Complaint alleges 
breach of a contractual relationship between Beehive and 
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Robinson. Specifically, Beehive contends that while acting as a 
distributor for Robinson, Beehive placed an order for 
approximately one million brick of a special color and 
manufacture. The order was placed pursuant to a request from a 
customer of Beehive named Emerson Larkin. Beehive contends that 
Robinson breached its contractual relationship with Beehive when 
it accepted the order and subsequently refused to perform. The 
District Court granted summary judgment with regard to this 
cause of action. Beehive asserts that the court erred in its 
decision in two respects. First, plaintiff believes that 
substantial issues of fact were contested. Second, Beehive 
contends that Robinson was not entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED DUE TO THE EXISTENCE 
OF MATERIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT 
Utah Courts have traditionally held that summary judgment is 
proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact in 
question. Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980), Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 
P.2d 387 (Utah 1984), Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 
1390 (Utah 1980). In evaluating the facts presented at Summary 
Judgment, the courts have held that any doubt or uncertainty 
should be viewed and resolved in favor of the party resisting 
summary judgment. In the case of Frisbee v. K & K Construction 
Co., 767 P.2d 387 (1984), the court held: 
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If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, doubt should be 
resolved in favor of the opposing party. 
Thus, the court must evaluate all evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn 
from evidence in light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment. 
Frisbee at 389. See also Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 
(Utah 1982), Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 395 P.2d, 62 (Utah 
1964), Bilhmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979). The 
Supreme Court has consistently held that the trial court can 
obtain statements of fact from several sources including 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions 
and affidavits. Heglar Ranch Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 
(Utah 1980). Additionally, the court has held that a single 
sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of facts 
precluding summary judgment. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 
(Utah 1983). Beehive contends that several of Robinson's 
"undisputed facts" were in fact disputed by sworn statements. 
In Robinson's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Record at p. 36), it presents as an undisputed 
fact that: 
I. Beehive claims to have sent Robco 
an order in writing for the so-called one 
million brick order. Browning Deposition at 
29 & Ex. 7. Robco claims not to have 
received any written order. Robco's manager 
of distributor sales, however, discussed 
Beehive's desire for the one million bricks 
over the telephone. Jones Deposition at 49, 
51, 71. The written order allegedly sent 
from Beehive to Robco was undated and did not 
indicate any date by which the Provincial 
Antique bricks should be delivered to 
Beehive. Browning Deposition at 29 & Ex. 7. 
At the time this order was placed, the price 
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for one milllion bricks was more than 
$500.00. Browning Deposition Ex. 8-11. 
(Record at page 40.) 
In reviewing these references to the record which Robinson uses 
to support the statement set out above, we find the following 
dialogue in the deposition of Beehivefs President, Randall 
Browning: 
Q The next document I want you to look at has been marked 
for identification purposes as Exhibit No. 7, and it 
appears to be a purchase order on a form with Beehive 
Brick, Inc. on it and it appears to be purchase order 
number 725, addressed to Robinson Brick Company. Tell 
me what that is. Have you seen it before, first of 
all? 
A Yes I have. 
Q Tell me what it is. 
A That is our purchase order to Robinson Brick on the 
order of one million brick placed to us by Emerson 
Larkin. 
Deposition of Randall Browning at page 29. 
Additionally, Robinson's general sales manager, Monte Jones 
States: 
Q Are you aware that Emerson Larkin had placed an order 
for a million provincial antique brick? 
A Through hearsay only. 
Q Do you recall who told you that they had? 
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A I recall a discussion with Dee Young concerning a 
desire for a million provincial antique. 
Q Do you know if that discussion occurred prior to 
October 15, 1985? 
A Yes. 
Deposition of Monte Jones at page 49. 
Beehive contends that Robinson's own references to the 
record, when viewed in a light most favorable to Beehive, create 
questions of fact as to whether or not an order was placed by 
Beehive and accepted by Robinson. 
Robinson further contends in its Memorandum of Support that 
the order was never confirmed in writing by Robinson. Robinson's 
Memorandum states as follows: 
K. The alleged one million brick order 
was never confirmed in writing by Robco. In 
particular, there exists no writing by which 
Robco confirmed that it would provide the 
million bricks to Beehive, that it would do 
so over a period of one year, or that it was 
able to produce the type of bricks that 
Beehive wished it to produce. Browning 
Deposition at 54 & Ex. 1-16; Jones Deposition 
at 81-82. 
(Record at page 40.) 
Beehive notes that Robinson supports this paragraph by 
referencing to Exhibits 1-16 which had been attached to the 
Browning Deposition. Exhibit 14 to said deposition is a letter 
dated April 17, 1986 from Monte S. Jones of Robinson Brick 
Company to Mr. Randall Browning of Beehive Brick which contains 
the following language: 
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5. The existing order of 1,000,000 Provincial 
Antique (special color) for Emerson Larkin cannot be 
produced. We will allow substitutions with the 
following: Dover Gray, Heritage Antique, Provincial 
Antique and Provincial Antique special lot. 
The following is a current list of open orders we 
are willing to fill, provided inventory is avail-
able: . . . 
Emerson Larkin Order 
040496 Provincial Antique 1,000,000 
(Dover Grey, Prov. Antiq., Hert. Antiq.) 
Beehive again contends that Robinson's own citation to the 
record, in support of its "undisputed fact," creates a question 
of fact as to the existence of a confirmation in writing by 
Robinson. Beehive's statement of additional and disputed facts 
contained in its Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
Record at 63 refers to the same letter (attached as Exhibit 2 to 
the Deposition of Monte Jones). Finally, the letter again was 
attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Dee Young, which was 
submitted in opposition to Robinson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Plaintiff contends that the language set forth above 
in the letter raises a question of fact as to the receipt and 
acceptance of the order by Robinson and its confirmation in 
writing. 
A third fact suggested by Robinson to be uncontested is: 
B. All of the test runs manufactured 
by Robco were unsatisfactory to Beehive and 
its customer and were rejected. Young 
Deposition at 41-46; Browning Deposition at 
88; Jones Deposition at 73-74. 
Record at page 41. 
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As noted above, Robinson supports this statement by citing 
to the Deposition of Dee Young, at 41-46. Upon examination of 
said deposition, we find that the test runs were not rejected by 
Beehive as indicated by the following testimony: 
Q Were you told how big the test run was? How many 
bricks involved? 
A. Seems to me the figure that I recall as best I recall/ 
was around 50,000 brick, somewhere in that range. 
Q. How many did you want? 
A. I don't recall the specific number for one of Emerson's 
next job we shipped an order of that test run. 
Q. Do you recall how many you received? 
A. I don't right now. 
Q. Was it less than 50,000? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Less than 10,000? 
A. I'm not sure. 
Q. Alright, you received the brick — what happened next? 
A. He used the brick and of course I went out to look at 
them with him to see what we thought and everything and 
we didn't see a great deal of difference between the 
stock provincial and the test run, but I called and 
spoke with Monte about that and I believe I talked with 
Jim and I was just reassured that although the 
superficial changes may not have been great that Jim 
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knows what he's doing and he's getting around to what 
he needs to do, I guess on a technical level. 
Q, Did you use the rest of the 50,000 of the test run? 
A. I believe we used them. 
Deposition of Dee Young at p. 42. 
With regard to the second test run, we find the following 
testimony: 
Q. Did Emerson Larkin take a look at those bricks? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was his response? 
A. That they were getting better. In fact, I remember the 
second run was good looking and when I went out to the 
house that he was doing with the first batch of them to 
see again how they looked, I remember being really 
excited when I was further away from the house driving 
toward it and then when I got closer I could see there 
were still some of the things that weren't most 
desirable, but it was definitely improved color. 
Q. What did Emerson Larkin say about it? 
A. About the same thing. They were on the way. We felt 
encouraged after the second run. 
Q. Did you order the rest of the bricks from that run? 
A. We used bricks from the rest of the run as he needed 
them. 
Deposition of Dee Young, at pages 44-45. 
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Finally, with regard to the third test run, Mr. Young 
testified as follows: 
Q. You received and Emerson Larkin received a portion of 
that run, I take it? 
A. That is correct. 
Deposition of Dee Young, at p. 46. 
Beehive's Statement of Additional and Disputed Facts, 
(Record at p. 64), states that all of the test runs were not 
rejected, and cites to the deposition of Dee Young, a portion of 
which has been reproduced above. 
Beehive contends that the testimony set out above creates a 
question of fact as to the acceptance or rejection of the test 
run provided to Beehive by Robinson. 
In light of the facts which were presented and disputed by 
the parties to this action, respondents contend that the facts 
when viewed in a light most favorable to Beehive indicate genuine 
issues of material fact which support the proposition that an 
order was placed, that it was accepted by Robinson, that a 
memorandum was generated which proves the existence of a 
contract, that it was performed in part and that the performance 
was generally accepted by Beehive, up to the time of Robinson's 
cancellation of the contract. Accordingly, the District Court 
erred in granting Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's First Cause 
of Action due to the existence of disputed material facts. 
17 
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED IN FAVOR OF ROBINSON 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The basis of Robinson's Motion for Summary Judgment with 
respect to Plaintiff's First Cause of Action focuses on the 
alleged unenforceability of the one million brick order placed by 
Beehive. Specifically, Robinson contends that the order placed 
by Beehive did not comply with the requirements of the statute of 
frauds as set forth in Section 70A-2-201. Beehive contends that 
the order did comply with the requirements of, or exceptions to, 
the statute of frauds in several respects. 
Section 70A-2-201(l) (Utah Code Annotated 1981 Rep Vol.) 
states that: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, 
a contract for the sale of goods for the 
price of $500 or more is not enforceable by 
way of action or defense unless there is some 
writing sufficient to indicate that a 
contract for sale has been made between the 
parties and signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized 
agent or broker. 
As noted above, Robinson Brick Company mailed a letter dated 
April 17, 198 6 to Mr. Randy Browning of Beehive which 
acknowledges the existence of the Order and a willingness on 
Robinson's part to fill the order (Record at 61). See also, 
Deposition of Monte Jones, Exhibit 2, Deposition of Randall 
Browning, Exhibit 14. Beehive contends that this letter 
fulfills the requirement that the writing "indicate that a 
contract for sale has been made between the party." 
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This letter also fulfills the requirements of Subpart 2 to 
the Statute of Frauds which states: 
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable 
time a writing in confirmation of the 
contract and sufficient against the sender is 
received and the party receiving it has 
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the 
requirements of subsection (1) against such 
party unless written notice of objection to 
its contents is given within 10 days after it 
is received. 
See 70A-2-20M2) (Utah Code Annotated 1981 Rep Vol.) 
Again, the letter of April 17, 1986 constitutes a writing in 
confirmation of the contract pursuant to subsection (2). The 
official comments to Section 2-201(2) of the Uniform Commercial 
Code indicate that a writing "need not contain all material terms 
of the contract and such material terms as are stated need not be 
precisely stated. All that is required is that the writing 
afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests 
on a real transaction." With regard to the sufficiency of the 
writing, the official comments again address only three 
requirements. 
"First, it must evidence a contract for the 
sale of goods; Second, it must be 'signed,1 
a word which includes authentication which 
identifies the party to be charged; and 
Third, it must specify a quantity." 
In reviewing the April 17, 1986 letter (Record at page 61), we 
find that there is evidence that a contract for the sale of goods 
exists by the language in said letter referring to the "existing 
order of one million provincial antique" and their willingness to 
fill said order from available inventory. We also note that the 
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letter was signed on behalf of Robinson Brick Company by Monte S. 
Jones, Manager, Distributor Sales Division. Finally, the 
quantity of brick (i.e., one million) is identified in two 
different places. 
Beehive acknowledges that the letter contains other terms 
and conditions of the proposed contracts relating to delivery 
dates, available colors and Robinson's ability to produce special 
colors. However, these issues are not relevant to the 
sufficiency of the document to satisfy the requirements of the 
statute of fraud. As noted above, a writing is not insufficient 
because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon by the 
parties. 
Assuming arguendo that the April 17, 1986 letter does not 
satisfy the requirements of subsections 1 and 2 of the Statute 
of Frauds, plaintiff would draw the courtfs attention to Section 
70A-2-201(3)(a), which states: 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the 
requirements of subsection (1) but which is 
valid in other respects is enforceable (a) if 
the goods are to be specially manufactured 
for the buyer and are not suitable for sale 
to others in the ordinary course of seller's 
business, and the seller before notice of 
repudiation is received and under circum-
stances which reasonably indicate that the 
goods are for the buyer, has made either a 
substantial beginning of their manufacture or 
commitments for their procurement. 
In analyzing subsection (3)(a), we note that a party may be 
excused from the "writing" requirements of subsection (1) and (2) 
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1. The goods are to be specially 
manufactured for the buyer. 
2. They are not suitable for sale to 
others in the ordinary course of seller's 
business. 
3. The seller has made a substantial 
beginning in their manufacture or commitments 
for their procurement prior to receipt of 
notice of repudiation. 
In applying the facts of this case to subsection (3), we 
note that brick in question were to be different in color than 
the provincial antique commonly stocked by Robinson and, as such, 
would need to be specially manufactured. (Record at p. 61. See 
also Deposition of Monte Jones, Exhibit 2, Deposition of Randall 
Browning, Exhibit 14). In addition, testimony of Dee Young 
indicates that approximately 400,000 brick out of the 1,000,000 
brick order had already been manufactured (See Deposition of Dee 
Young, pages 41-46). No evidence was presented by Robinson which 
would indicate that the special color brick were or were not 
suitable for resale to other Robinson customers. Beehive 
contends that these facts support the requirements of subsection 
(3) of the Statute of Frauds. Accordingly, even if we assume 
that a memorandum evidencing the contract does not exist, the 
attempted special manufacture of the goods requested by Beehive 
creates a contract which satisfies the requirements of Section 
70A-2-20M3) . 
The Code also provides an exception to the Statute of 
Frauds rule. Section 70A-2-206 Utah Code Annotated (1981 Rep 
Vol.) indicates that: 
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(b) An order or other offer to buy goods for 
prompt current shipment shall be construed as 
inviting acceptance either by prompt promise 
to ship or by prompt or current shipment of 
conforming or nonconforming goods. . . . 
In other words, an order or offer to purchase goods may be 
deemed accepted if the seller promises to ship or in fact ships 
the goods to the buyer. 
Robinson promised to ship the goods to Beehive by virtue of 
its letter of July 22, 1985 (See Deposition of Randy Browning, 
Exhibit 13), which allows orders to be placed and implies that 
they will be filled and shipped. In addition, it is undisputed 
that three test runs totalling approximately 40% of the total 
order were in fact shipped and delivered to Beehive. Questions 
as to whether or not the shipments were conforming or 
nonconforming are irrelevant for purposes of establishing the 
enforceability of the contract. Accordingly, even if 
nonconforming goods were in part rejected by Beehive, the 
shipment of the goods constitutes an acceptance of Robinson's 
order. The District Court erred in granting summary judgment as 
a matter of law. 
II. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO 
BEEHIVE'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
In addition to the specific contract referred to in the 
First Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint, Beehive's Fourth 
Cause of Action also alleges breach of a contract relating to 
Robinson's agreement to grant Beehive a distributorship to sell 
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Robinson products. Robinson does not deny the existence of a 
Distributorship Agreement, but rather states that any promises 
made with regard to said distributorship are unenforceable since 
they do not meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds as 
found in Section 70A-2-201, Utah Code Annotated. Beehive 
contends that the court erred as a matter of law in adopting 
Robinson's contention and granting summary judgment as to the 
Fourth Cause of Action. 
Several documents exist which establish the existence of the 
distributor relationship between Beehive and Robinson. On July 
22, 1985, Monte S. Jones acting on behalf of Robinson Brick 
Company sent a letter to Beehive regarding the status of the 
temporary distributorship (See Deposition of Randall Browning, 
Exhibit 13). In examining the letter, we find that the 
distributor relationship is acknowledged by Robinson and, in 
fact, Beehive was praised for the excellent work they had done to 
that point in time. Additionally, the April 17, 1986 letter from 
Robinson to Beehive Brick again refers to the distributor 
relationship between the two parties. . Record at page 61, 
Deposition of Randall Browning, Exhibit 13, Deposition of Monte 
Jones, Exhibit 2. And finally, in their Answer to plaintiff's 
complaint, Robinson admits that at least a temporary 
distributorship was awarded (Record at page 15). Accordingly, 
it is undisputed that a distributorship relationship of some type 
existed between Beehive and Robinson. Both the letter of July 
22, 1985 and the letter of April 17, 1986 would constitute 
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writings which would satisfy the requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds. In addition, Robinson's admission that a distributorship 
was granted satisfies the requirements of the Statute of Frauds 
as set forth in Section 70A-2-201(3)(b) Utah Code Annotated (1981 
Rep. Vol.) which states: 
"A contract which does not satisfy the 
requirements of subsection (1) but which is 
valid in other respects is enforceable. . . 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is 
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or 
otherwise in court that the contract for sale 
was made, but the contract is not enforceable 
under this provision beyond the quantity of 
the goods admitted." 
Accordingly, the Statute of Frauds is satisfied as to the 
temporary distributorship in two respects: First, there are two 
writings sufficient to indicate that a contract had been made as 
required by 70A-2-201(l) and, secondly, the existence of a 
distributorship was admitted in the pleading satisfying the 
requirement of Section 70A-2-201(3)(b). The court should not 
have granted summary judgment based upon the failure of Beehive 
to produce a writing which evidenced the existence of a 
distributorship agreement. 
Beehive will acknowledge that there is a question as to the 
specific terms and conditions of the distributorship agreement. 
Beehive contends that a specific term and condition of the 
distributorship was that Robinson would convert the temporary 
distributorship to a permanent distributorship if Beehive could 
adequately represent Robinson's interest. See Deposition of 
Randall Browning, page 75, Deposition of Dee Young, pages 19-20 
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(Record at page 63). Robinson contends that the contract was 
essentially terminable at will (See Deposition of Monte Jones, 
page 30). While these issues are obviously important to the 
performance of the contract, they do not serve to limit its 
enforceability. If we view the facts relating to these issues in 
a light most favorable to Beehive, we find that a distributorship 
agreement was granted which contained a provision allowing for 
the indefinite extension of the agreement, contingent only upon 
Beehive's adequate performance. Accordingly, the District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment as to the Fourth Cause of 
Action. 
III. THE OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING IS APPLIED IN EVERY CONTRACT 
AND, AS SUCH, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO 
BEEHIVE'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Beehive's Second Cause of Action alleges that Robinson 
breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in 
every contract and expressly required in Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code transactions (See 70A-1-203 Utah Code Annotated, 1981 Rep 
Vol.). At hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Robinson 
argued that because the contracts were unenforceable under the 
Statute of Frauds that the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing did not apply to this case. Beehive contends that the 
District Court erred in accepting this argument. 
The Statute of Frauds as found in Section 70A-2-201 does not 
indicate that a contract is void or voidable simply because the 
contract does not comply with the Statute of Frauds. Rather, the 
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section merely states that a contract which fails to comply with 
the statute is not "enforceable by way of action or defense." 
Although in some cases an unforceable contract is tantamount to a 
void contract, this is not always the case. For example, 
contracts which fail to comply with the Statute of Frauds but are 
nevertheless capable of being performed by the parties are not 
deemed void. The parties to such a contract have a duty to act 
in good faith even though the contract may not be enforceable in 
a court of law. Accordingly, even if we assume that the 
contracts referred to above are not enforceable, this should not 
excuse either party from acting in good faith. 
In addition, as a matter of policy the court should hold 
that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing extends to all 
aspects of the contract relationship, even those dealings which 
exist prior to the formalization of the contract. To hold 
otherwise would be to sanction bad faith activities during the 
early periods of the contractual relationships (i.e., negotia-
tions) and thereafter require the parties to deal strictly in 
good faith when performing the contract. Such a requirement 
would not only be inconsistent but would remove the obligation to 
act in good faith at the time when it is most crucial that the 
parties deal fairly with each other. Accordingly, the District 
Court should not have dismissed plaintiff's Second Cause of 
Action. 
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IV. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST WITH 
REGARD TO ROBINSON'S INTERFERENCE WITH 
BEEHIVE'S CONTRACTS AND, AS SUCHr THE DISTRICT 
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Robinson contended that 
it did not interfere with any contracts which Beehive had with 
third parties, as alleged in Beehive's Third Cause of Action 
(Record at page 42). In support of this proposition, they refer 
to the Deposition of Randall Browning, pages 118 and 119 and the 
Deposition of Monte Jones, at page 69. Once again Robinsons own 
citation to the record supports Beehive's position. In the 
Deposition of Randall Browning, we find the following dialogue: 
(Q) My question to you, Mr. Browning, is whether you have 
personal knowledge of any instance in which Robinson 
Brick has instructed any of its authorized agents to 
contact your customers. 
A My response would be that the only instance that we're 
referred to there is with Emerson Larkin. He was 
contacted by Interstate Brick the day following us 
being cut off as a distributor and was asked to give 
his million brick order that he had previously given to 
Beehive Brick, to Interstate Brick and I think that the 
only source that could come from would be Robinson 
Brick. 
Deposition of Randall Browining at page 118. 
Based upon the foregoing testimony, Beehive contends that 
Robinson's new distributor contacted a customer of Beehive at 
Robinson's urging to see if the new distributor could complete 
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the million brick order. Beehive contends that these statements 
alone are sufficient to establish a question of fact as to 
Robinson's liability for interference with Beehive's contracts. 
Accordingly, the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment on the Third Cause of Action. 
V. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT 
EXIST AND, AS SUCH, THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
BEEHIVE'S FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Beehive's Fifth Cause of Action is an action in quantum 
meruit claiming that Robinson was unjustly enriched by the 
services provided by Beehive during the time when Beehive was a 
distributor for Robinson. In support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Robinson asserted that Beehive did not provide Robinson 
with any goods or services (Record at page 43). In support of 
this assertion, they refer to page 116 of the Deposition of 
Randall Browning. Beehive argued that this fact was in dispute 
and affirmatively asserted that it did provide services for 
Robinson at a time when Robinson had no other distributor in the 
Salt Lake area (Record at page 64) . 
Unjust enrichment is the doctrine under which the law will 
imply a promise to pay for goods or services when there is 
neither an actual or implied contract between the parties. 
Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County, 734 P.2d 910 (Utah 
1987). In Barrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984), the 
courts enumerated the elements of unjust enrichment as follows: 
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There must be (1) a benefit conferred on one 
person by another; (2) an appreciation or 
knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and 
(3) the acceptance or retention by the 
conferee of the benefit under such circum-
stances as to make it inequitable for the 
conferee to retain the benefit without 
payment of its value. 
Between the dates of March 1, 1985 and April 16, 1986, Beehive 
acted as the representative of Robinson in the Salt Lake area at 
a time when Robinson had lost its previous dealer. In so acting 
as a distributor, Beehive maintained Robinson's market position 
and therefore conferred a benefit on said defendant. Further, 
Beehive contends that it only agreed to perform this service with 
the expectation that it would be rewarded for its efforts by 
being allowed to continue in the business relationship contingent 
only upon its satisfactory performance (Record age page 63). At 
all times during the distributor period, Robinson not only 
accepted the benefits being rendered by Beehive but encouraged 
Beehive to put forth additional effort in order to win 
appointment of the permanent distributorship (Deposition of Dee 
Young at pages 20-21). These facts at least call to question the 
possibility of an unjust enrichment of Robinson at Beehive's 
expense, and should have precluded Summary Judgment in this 
matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Beehive maintains that it has complied with the Statute of 
Frauds and, as such, both contracts identified in Plaintiff's 
First and Fourth Causes of Action are enforceable. Beehive's 
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Second, Third and Fifth Causes of Action should not have been 
dismissed due to substantial issues of law and fact which were 
unresolved at the time of summary judgment. 
Beehive requests that the court reverse the decision of the 
Third Judicial District Court as to all causes of action, and 
remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this //rrf day of December, 1987. 
STAHTORET NlELgQH^-
Attorney for/Petitioner 
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